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Abstract. We present R2U2, a novel framework for runtime monitoring of se-
curity properties and diagnosing of security threats on-board Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS). R2U2, implemented in FPGA hardware, is a real-time, REAL-
IZABLE, RESPONSIVE, UNOBTRUSIVE Unit for security threat detection. R2U2
is designed to continuously monitor inputs from the GPS and the ground control
station, sensor readings, actuator outputs, and flight software status. By simul-
taneously monitoring and performing statistical reasoning, attack patterns and
post-attack discrepancies in the UAS behavior can be detected. R2U2 uses run-
time observer pairs for linear and metric temporal logics for property monitoring
and Bayesian networks for diagnosis of security threats. We discuss the design
and implementation that now enables R2U2 to handle security threats and present
simulation results of several attack scenarios on the NASA DragonEye UAS.
1 Introduction
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are starting to permeate many areas in everyday life.
From toy quadcopters, to industrial aircraft for delivery, crop dusting, public safety,
and military operations, UAS of vastly different weight, size, and complexity are used.
Although the hardware technology has significantly advanced in the past years, there
are still considerable issues to be solved before UAS can be used safely. Perhaps the
biggest concern is the integration of UAS into the national airspace (NAS), where they
have to seamlessly blend into the crowded skies and obey Air Traffic Control commands
without endangering other aircraft or lives and property on the ground [5].
A related topic, which has been vastly neglected so far, is security [24]. All sensors
and software set up to ensure UAS safety are useless if a malicious attack can cause
the UAS to crash, be abducted, or cause severe damage or loss of life. Often, live video
feeds from military UAS are not encrypted, so people on the ground, with only minimal
and off-the-shelf components, could see the same images as the remote UAS operator
[30]. In 2011, Iran allegedly abducted a CIA drone by jamming its command link and
spoofing its GPS. Instead of returning to the CIA base, the UAS was directed to land
on Iranian territory [6]. Even large research UAS worth millions of dollars are con-
trolled via unencrypted RF connections; most UAS communicate over a large number
of possible channels [9], relying on the assumption that “one would have to know the
frequencies” to send and receive data.
There are multiple reasons for these gaping security holes: most UAS flight com-
puters are extremely weak with respect to computing power. Thus, on-board encryption
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2is not possible, especially for larger data volumes as produced, for example, by on-
board cameras. Another reason is that a lot of UAS technology stems from the Hobby
RC area, where security is of low concern. Finally, security aspects have only played a
minor role in FAA regulation to date [7].
On a UAS, there are multiple attack surfaces: the communication link, sensor jam-
ming or spoofing, exploitation of software-related issues, and physical attacks like
catching a UAS in a net. In this paper, we focus on the detection of communication,
sensor, and software-related security threats, but do not elaborate on attack prevention
or possible mitigation strategies. Though design-time verification and validation activ-
ities can secure a number of attack surfaces, an actual attack will, most likely, happen
while the UAS is in the air. We therefore propose the use of dynamic monitoring, threat
detection, and security diagnosis.
In order to minimize impact on the flight software and the usually weak flight com-
puter, R2U2 is implemented using FPGA hardware. This no-overhead implementation
is designed to uphold the FAA requirements of REALIZABILITY and UNOBTRUSIVE-
NESS. To our knowledge, there are only two previous embedded hardware monitoring
frameworks capable of analyzing formal properties: P2V [15] and BusMOP [23,19].
However, P2V is a PSL to Verilog compiler that violates our UNOBTRUSIVENESS re-
quirement by instrumenting software. Like R2U2, BusMOP can monitor COTS pe-
ripherals, achieving zero runtime overhead via a bus-interface and an implementation
on a reconfigurable FPGA. However, BusMOP violates our REALIZABILITY require-
ment by reporting only property failure and handling only past-time logics whereas we
require early-as-possible reporting of future-time temporal properties passing and in-
termediate status updates. BusMOP also violates UNOBTRUSIVENESS by executing
arbitrary user-supplied code on the occurrence of any property violation.
Previously, we developed our on-board monitoring and diagnosis framework R2U2
for system health management of hardware-only components and developed implemen-
tations to detect hardware failures [26,8,28]. We defined and proved correct our FPGA
temporal logic observer encodings [26] and our Bayesian network (BN) encodings [8],
which comprise R2U2’s underlying health model. We also envisioned a compositional
building-block framework for integration with other diagnosis technologies that also an-
alyzed software components [28]; in this paper, we follow up on that idea by providing
the first implementation of R2U2 that includes software components.
Here, we extend R2U2 to enable the dynamic monitoring of the flight software, the
communication stream, and sensor values for indications of a malicious attack on the
autopilot and, even more importantly, to be able to quickly and reliably detect post-
attack behavior of the UAS. The temporal and probabilistic health models and their
FPGA implementations are suited for fast detection and diagnosis of attacks and post-
attack behavior. The separate FPGA implementation of a security extension to R2U2
described in this paper is highly resilient to attacks, being an isolated hardware entity
and programmed using VHDL. Javaid et al. [10] also analyze cybersecurity threats for
UAS. They simulated the effects of attacks that usually ended in a crash, focusing on
identifying different existing attack surfaces and vulnerabilities rather than focusing on
runtime detection or post-attack analysis. TeStID [2], ORCHIDS [21] and MONID [20]
are intrusion detection systems that use temporal logic to specify attack patterns. These
3security monitoring frameworks are targeted at IT systems and infrastructure.
Our contributions include:
– extending R2U2 from monitoring of safety properties of hardware [26,8] to inte-
grating hardware and software bus traffic monitoring for security threats thus en-
abling on-board, real-time detection of attack scenarios and post-attack behavior;
– detection of attack patterns rather than component failures;
– ensuring monitoring and reasoning are isolated from in-flight attacks; our FPGA
implementation provides a platform for secure and independent monitoring and
diagnosis that is not re-programmable in-flight by attackers;
– demonstrating R2U2 via case studies on a real NASA DragonEye UAS; and
– implementing a novel extension of R2U2 that we release to enable others to repro-
duce and build upon our work: http://temporallogic.org/research/RV15.html.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background in-
formation on our UAS platform, the open-source flight software, and the R2U2 frame-
work. Section 3 is devoted to our approach of using temporal logic observers and BN
diagnostic reasoning for detection of security threats and post-attack UAS behavior. In
Section 4, we will illustrate our approach with several small case studies on attacks
through the ground control station (GCS), attempts to hijack a UAS through an attacker
GCS, and GPS spoofing. Finally, Section 5 discusses future work and concludes.
2 Background
For this paper, we consider a simple and small UAS platform, the NASA DragonEye
(Figure 1A). With a wingspan of 1.1m it is small, but shares many commonalities with
larger and more complex UAS. Figure 1B shows a high-level, generic UAS architecture:
the UAS is controlled by an on-board flight computer running the flight software (FSW).
It receives measurements from various sensors, like barometric pressure and airspeed,
GPS, compass readings, and readings from the inertial measurement unit (IMU). Based
upon this information and a flight plan, the FSW calculates the necessary adjustments
of the actuators: elevator, rudder, ailerons, throttle. A ground control station (GCS)
computer transmits commands and flight plans to the UAS, and receives and displays
UAS telemetry information. For fully autonomous missions, there is no link between
the UAS and the GCS.
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Fig. 1. A: Photo of NASA DragonEye. B: High level system architecture of a small UAS.
Our example system uses the open-source FSW ”APM:Plane” [3], which does not
contain any security features like command or data encryption for the GCS-UAS link
4per default. We nevertheless selected this FSW because it very closely resembles the
architecture of both similarly small and larger, more complex UAS. This architecture
allows us to easily carry out white-box experiments and to study the relationship be-
tween attacks and post-attack behavior. Results of our studies can be carried over to
highly secure and resilient flight software.
2.1 R2U2
Developed to continuously monitor system and safety properties of an UAS in flight,
our real-time R2U2 (REALIZABLE, RESPONSIVE, and UNOBTRUSIVE Unit) has been
implemented on an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array). Hierarchical and modu-
lar models within this framework are defined using Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) and
mission-time Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [26] for expressing temporal properties and
Bayesian Networks (BN) for probabilistic and diagnostic reasoning. In the following,
we give a high-level overview over the R2U2 framework and its FPGA implementation.
For details on temporal reasoning, its implementation, and semantics the reader is re-
ferred to [26]; [8] describes details on the FPGA implementation of Bayesian networks.
Also [29] provides details on R2U2 modeling and system health management.
Temporal Logic Observers LTL and MTL formulas consist of propositional vari-
ables, the logic operators ^, _, ¬, or !, and temporal operators to express tempo-
ral relationships between events. For LTL formulas p, q, we have ⇤p (ALWAYS p),
⌃p (EVENTUALLY p), Xp (NEXTTIME p), pUq (pUNTIL q), and pRq (pRELEASES q)
with their usual semantics [26]. For MTL, each of the temporal operators are accom-
panied by upper and lower time bounds that express the time period during which the
operator must hold. Specifically, MTL includes the operators⇤[i,j] p, ⌃[i,j] p, p U[i,j] q,
and pR[i,j] q where the temporal operator applies over the interval between time i and
time j, inclusive, and time steps refer to ticks of the system clock. For mission-bounded
LTL operators these time bounds are implied to be the start and end of the UASmission.
Bayesian Networks for Health Models In many situations, temporal logic monitor-
ing might find several violations of security and safety properties. For example, a cer-
tain system state might have been caused by an attack or by a bad sensor; we can use
the combination of property violations to determine which one. In order to be able to
disambiguate the root causes, the R2U2 framework uses Bayesian Networks (BN) for
diagnostic reasoning. BNs are directed acyclic graphs, where each node represents a
statistical variable. They are well-established in the area of diagnostic and health man-
agement (e.g., [22,18]). Conditional dependencies between the different statistical vari-
ables are represented by directed edges; local conditional probabilities are stored in the
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) of each node [8,27,29]. R2U2 evaluates posterior
probabilities, which reflect the most likely root causes at each time step.
2.2 FPGA Implementation
R2U2 is implemented in FPGA hardware (Figure 2). Signals from the flight computer
and communication buses are filtered and discretized in the signal processing (SP) unit
to obtain streams of propositional variables. The runtime verification (RV) and runtime
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Fig. 2. Principled R2U2 implementation
reasoning (RR) units comprise the proper
health management hardware: the RV unit
monitors MTL/LTL properties using pairs of
synchronous and asynchronous observers de-
fined in [26]. After the temporal logic formu-
las have been evaluated, the results are trans-
ferred to the RR subsystem, where the com-
piled Bayesian network is evaluated to yield
the posterior marginals of the health model.
3 Our Approach to Threat-Detection
For our approach, we consider the “system” UAS (as depicted in Figure 1B) as a com-
plex feedback system. Commands, GPS readings, and measurements of the sensors are
processed by the FSW on the flight computer to calculate new values for the actuators,
and to update its internal status. In this paper, we assume that all malicious attacks are
attempted via communication during flight.3 Furthermore, all communications to the
UAS are received via a wireless link from the ground control station, or GPS satellites,
or transmitters only. Spoofing of the compass sensor, for example, via a strong magnetic
field is outside the scope of R2U2.
With our R2U2 framework, we continuously monitor inputs from ground control
and GPS and can identify many attack mechanisms and surfaces. Typical examples
include denial-of-service, sending of illegal or dangerous commands, or jamming of
the GPS receiver. Because, in most cases, information about the communication does
not suffice to reliably identify an attack scenario, additional supporting information is
necessary. This will be obtained from the analysis of post-attack behavior of the UAS.
Any successful attack on the UAS will result in some unusual and undesired behavior
of the UAS.
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Fig. 3. High-level architecture of R2U2
Monitoring the system inputs and analyz-
ing the post-attack behavior are not indepen-
dent from each other so we have to model
their interactions within our R2U2 frame-
work. Typically, a certain input pattern fol-
lowed by a specific behavior characterizes
an attack. For example, a strong oscillation
in the aircraft movement that was triggered
by an unusual GCS command indicates an
attack (or an irresponsible pilot). Similarly,
transients in GPS signals followed by subtle
position movements could be telltales of a GPS spoofing attack. Figure 3 shows how
our R2U2 framework monitors the various inputs going into the UAS system (GCS
and GPS), as well as sensor/actuator signals and status of the flight software for post-
attack analysis. We next consider modeling for attacks and post-attack behavior, loosely
following [14].
3 We do not model attack scenarios via compromised flight software.
63.1 Attack Monitoring
As all attacks are initiated through the GCS or GPS inputs, we monitor the following
attack surfaces. Because of zero-day attack mechanisms, this list will always be incom-
plete [4]. Note that the occurrence of such a situation does not mean that an actual attack
is happening; other reasons like unusual flight conditions, transmission errors, or faulty
hard- or software might be the reason.
Ill-formatted and illegal commands should not be processed by the FSW. Such com-
mands could result from transmission errors or might be part of an attack. If such
commands are received repeatedly a denial-of-service attack might be happening.
Dangerous commands are properly formatted but might cause severe problems or
even a crash depending on the UAS mode. For example, a “reset-FSW” command
sent to the UAS while in the air, will, most certainly, lead to a crash of the UAS
because all communication and system parameters are lost. Thus, in all likelihood,
this command indicates a malicious attack. Other dangerous commands are, for ex-
ample, the setting of a gain in the control loops during flight. However, there are
situations where such a command is perfectly legal and necessary.
Nonsensical or repeated navigation commands could point to a malicious attack. Al-
though new navigation waypoints can be sent to a UAS during flight to update its
mission, repeated sending of waypoints with identical coordinates, or weird/erro-
neous coordinates might indicate an attack.
Transients in GPS signals might be signs of GPS spoofing or jamming. Because the
quality of UAS navigation strongly depends on the quality of the received GPS sig-
nals, sudden transients in the number of available satellites, or signal strength and
noise ratios (Jamming-to-Noise Sensing [9]) might indicate a GPS-based attack.
It should be noted that these patterns do not provide enough evidence to reliably
identify an attack. Only in correspondence with a matching post-attack behavior are
we able to separate malicious attacks from unusual, but legal command sequences. We
therefore also monitor UAS behavior.
3.2 System Behavior Monitoring
Our R2U2 models for monitoring post-attack behavior obtain their information from
the UAS sensors, actuators, and the flight computer. In our current setting, we do not
monitor those electrical signals directly, but obtain their values from the FSW. This
simplification, however, prevents our current implementation from detecting a crash of
the flight software initiated by a malicious attack. With our R2U2 framework we are
able to monitor the following UAS behaviors, which might (or might not be) the result
of a malicious attack.
Oscillations of the aircraft around any of its axes hampers the aircraft’s performance
and can lead to disintegration of the plane and a subsequent crash. Pilot-induced
oscillations (PIO) in commercial aircraft have caused severe accidents and loss of
life. In a UAS such oscillations can be caused by issuing appropriate command
sequences or by setting gains of the control loops to bad values. Oscillations of
higher frequencies can cause damage due to vibration or can render on-board cam-
eras inoperative.
7Deviation from flight path: In the nominal case, a UAS flies from one waypoint to the
next via a direct path. Sudden deviations from such a straight path could indicate
some unplanned or possibly unwelcome maneuver. The same observation holds for
sudden climbs or descents of the UAS.
Sensor Readings: Sudden changes of sensor readings or consistent drift in the same
direction might also be part of a post-attack behavior. Here again, such behavior
might have been caused by, for example, a failing sensor.
Unusual software behavior like memory leaks, increased number of real-time fail-
ures, or illegal numerical values can possibly point to an on-going malicious at-
tack. In the case of software, such a behavior might be a post-attack behavior or the
manifestation of the attack mechanism itself. Therefore, security models involving
software health are the most complex ones.
3.3 R2U2 Models
We capture the specific patterns for each of the attack and behavior observers with
temporal logic and Bayesian networks. We also use these mechanisms to specify the
temporal, causal, and probabilistic relationships between them. As a high-level expla-
nation, an attack is detected if a behavioral pattern B is observed some time after a
triggering attack A has been monitored. Temporal constraints ensure that these events
are actually correlated. So, for example, we can express that an oscillation of the UAS
(osc = true) occurs between 100-200 time steps after the control loop parameters have
been altered (param change = true). Any trace satisfying the following formula could
indicate an attack.
⇤(param change ^ ⌃[100,200]osc)
3.4 Modeling Variants and Patterns
The combination of signal processing, filtering, past-time and future-time MTL, and
Bayesian reasoning provides a highly expressive medium for formulating security prop-
erties. Further generality can be achieved by grouping related indicators. For example,
we can define groups of dangerous commands, unusual repeated commands, or events:
dangerous cmds = cmd reset _ cmd calibrate sensor _ cmd disarm . . .
unusual cmds airborne = cmd get params _ set params _ get waypoints . . .
unusual cmds periodic = cmd nav to _ cmd mode change _ invalid packet rcvd
This enables us to directly use these preprocessed groups in temporal formulas and
feed them into a BN, thereby supporting simple reuse of common patterns and assist to
create more comprehensive security models. The following example demonstrates how
we use such patterns to specify that there shall be no dangerous commands between
takeoff and landing.
⇤[(CMD == takeoff)! ((¬ dangerous cmds) U landing complete)]
83.5 Bayesian Networks for Security Diagnosis
Most models of attack monitoring and post-attack behavior are capable of indicat-
ing that there might have been an attack, but cannot reliably detect one as such, be-
cause the observed patterns could have been caused by a sensor failure, for example.
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Fig. 4. Threat detection with R2U2 model
However, we can use the Bayesian
network (BN) reasoning engine of
R2U2 to perform better probabilis-
tic diagnosis. For details of Bayesian
R2U2 models see [29]. The results
of all the temporal observers are pro-
vided as inputs to the observable
nodes (shaded in Figure 4) of the
BN. The internal structure of the BN
then determines how likely a specific
attack or failure scenario is. Prior information on how likely a certain monitor fires
helps to disambiguate the diagnosis. For example, a sudden change in measured alti-
tude could be attributed to a failing barometric altimeter, a failing laser altimeter, a fail-
ing GPS receiver, or a GPS spoofing attack. In order to determine the most likely root
cause, additional information about recently received commands, or the signal strength
of the GPS receiver can be used. So, transients in GPS signal strength with otherwise
healthy sensors (i.e., measured barometric and laser altitude coincide) make an attack
more likely. On the other hand, strongly diverging readings from the on-board altitude
sensors make a sensor failure more likely. With prior information added to the BN, we
can, for example, express that the laser altimeter is much more likely to fail than the
barometric altimeter or the GPS sensor. Also, GPS transients might be more likely in
areas with an overall low signal strength. Since a BN is capable of expressing, in a
statistically correct way, the interrelationships of a multitude of different signals and
outputs of temporal observers, R2U2 can provide best-possible attack diagnosis results
as sketched in Figure 4.
4 Experiments and Results
Our experiments can be run either in a software-in-the-loop (SITL) simulation or di-
rectly on the UAS; most of the experiments in this paper were executed on our Ironbird
processor-in-the-loop setup, which consists of the original UAS flight computer hard-
ware components in a laboratory environment. In all configurations, the produced data
traces were forwarded via a UART transmission to the R2U2 framework running on an
Adapteva Parallella Board [1]. R2U2 is implemented on this credit-card sized, low-cost
platform where the actual monitoring is performed inside the Xilinx4 zynq xc7z010
FPGA. Our R2U2 implementation (Figure 2) uses 40% of the FPGA’s slice registers
and 64% of its slice look-up tables (LUTs). These numbers are independent of the size
and structure of the LTL and MTL formulas. The implementation in this paper used
4 http://www.xilinx.com
9128 input signals through the UART to the FPGA, though this number could be ex-
tended for other implementations. The R2U2 framework is running with a maximum
frequency 85.164MHz. A Ubuntu Linux installation on the Parallella board is used for
the interface configuration, signal preprocessing, and evaluation of arithmetic circuits.
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Fig. 5. R2U2 SITL test setup
In our SITL simulation (Figure 5), the
UAS flight behavior is simulated by the
open source JSBSim [11] flight dynamics
model. All hardware components are em-
ulated by SITL low-level drivers, which
enables us to inject the desired behav-
ior without the risk of damaging the air-
craft during a real test flight. The oper-
ator’s GCS is connected to the UAS via
an open source MAVLink proxy [17]. We
also connect a second GCS to the proxy
in order to simulate the attackers injected MAVLink packets.
4.1 Dangerous MAV Commands
In addition to commands controlling the actual flight, the MAVLink protocol allows the
user to remotely setup and configure the aircraft. In particular, parameters that control
the feedback loops inside the FSW can be defined, as they need to be carefully adjusted
to match the flight dynamics of the given aircraft. Such commands, which substantially
alter the behavior of the UAS can, when given during flight, cause dangerous behavior
of the UAS or a potential crash. In 2000, a pilot of a Predator UAS inadvertently sent a
command ”Program AV EEPROM” while the UAS was in the air. This caused all FSW
parameters and information about communication frequencies to be erased on the UAS.
Communication to the UAS could not be reestablished and the UAS crashed causing a
total loss $3.7M [32]. If parameters for the FSW control loops are set to extreme values
during flight, the aircraft can experience oscillations that could lead to disintegration of
the UAS and subsequent crash. Therefore, such commands might be welcome targets
for a malicious attack.
In this experiment, we set up our R2U2 to capture and report such dangerous behav-
ior. Our security model consists of two parts: (a) detection that a potentially dangerous
MAV command has been issued, and (b) that a dangerous behavior (in our case, os-
cillation around the pitch axis) occurs. Each of the parts seen individually does not
give an indication of an attack: MAV commands to change parameters are perfectly
legal in most circumstances. On the other hand, oscillations can be caused by turbu-
lence, aircraft design, or the pilot (pilot-induced-oscillations). Only the right temporal
combination of both pieces of information allows us to deduce that a malicious at-
tack has occurred: after receiving the “set parameter” command, a substantial and per-
sistent oscillation must follow soon thereafter. In our model we use the specification
⇤(C ^ ⌃[0,1200](⇤[0,300]O)) where O is the occurrence of oscillations and C the event
of receiving a “set parameter” command. We require that the oscillation persists for at
least 300 time steps and is separated by the command by not more than 1200 time steps.
10
−0.5
0   
0.5 
 
 
pitch
MAV
0  
50 
100
150
 
 
density low freq
density high freq
F
TF
TF
T
 
 
at1
at2
at3
0   2000 4000 6000 8000
F
T
F
T
timestamp [x200ms]
 
 
Attackosc1
Attackosc2
Fig. 6. UAS behavior after malicious setting of gain
parameters
The event C can be directly extracted
from the stream of received MAV
commands; oscillations can be de-
tected with the help of a Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) on the pitch, roll, or
yaw angular values. Figure 6 shows
how such an attack occurs. The top
panel shows the UAS pitch as well
as the points in time when a “set-
parameter” command has been re-
ceived (blue boxes). Caused by a mali-
cious command (setting pitch gain ex-
tremely high) issued at around t =
2800, a strong low-frequency up-down
oscillation appears in the pitch axis.
That excessive gain is turned off at
around t = 5100 and the oscillation
subsides. Shortly afterwards, at t =
5900, a malicious setting of a damping coefficient causes smaller oscillations but at
a higher frequency. This oscillation ramps up much quicker and ends with resetting
that parameter. In the second panel, two elements of the power spectrum obtained
by an FFT transform of the pitch signals are shown. The signals, which have been
subjected to a low-pass filter clearly indicate the occurrence of a low (red) and high
(blue) frequency oscillation. The third panel shows the actual Boolean inputs for R2U2:
“set-parameter received” C (green), “Low-frequency-oscillation” OL (red), and “high-
frequency-oscillation” OH (blue). The bottom panel shows valuations of formulas
⇤(C ^ ⌃[0,1200](⇤[0,300]OL)) and ⇤(C ^ ⌃[0,500](⇤[0,200]OH)) as produced by the
R2U2 monitor. On the latter property the maximal lead time of the malicious attack
has been set to only 500 time steps to reduce the number of false alarms, because the
high-frequency oscillation ramps up almost immediately. We estimate that 10 person-
hours were spent writing, debugging, and revising the two temporal logic properties
used for this experiment and approximately 30 hours were spent on experimental setup
and simulation.
4.2 DoS hijack Attack
Attackers continuously find new ways to break into and compromise a system. There-
fore, it is challenging to account for every possible attack scenario, since there can
always be an unforeseen loophole. The following experiment shows how our R2U2
framework can detect an intrusion without the need of an explicit security model for
each specific scenario. Here, we will look at possible indicators that can be grouped
into patterns as described earlier.
In our simulation we initiate a sophisticated attack to hijack the UAS by first trying
to establish a link from the attacker’s GCS to the UAS. Because the attacker has to
cope with issues like an incorrect channel, a different version of the protocol, or link
encryption, a large number of bad command packets will be received within a short
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time frame. The top panel of Figure 7 shows such a typical situation (black). The
R2U2 security model could use, for example, the following formula for detection given
the rate of received bad command packages Rb per time step:
F1 ⌘ ⇤[0,10](Rb = 0 _ (Rb   1 U[0,10]Rb = 0))
The formula F1 means that no more than one bad command is received within each
time interval of length 10 time steps.
Next, an attacker could try to gather information about the UAS, e.g., by requesting
aircraft parameters or trying to download the waypoints using the MAVLink protocol.
This activity is shown in Figure 7 as blue spikes between time step 1000 and 1300. For
our model, we use the input command groups defined earlier. With Cu as the event of
receiving an unusual command, we state that no unusual command should be received
after takeoff until the UAS has landed.
F2 ⌘ ⇤((CMD == takeoff)! ( ¬ Cu) U landing complete)
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Fig. 7. UAS DoS hijack results
Finally, an attacker may flood the
communication link in a way similar to a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack by send-
ing continuous requests Cnav to navi-
gate to the attacker’s coordinates, com-
bined with requests Chomeloc to set the
home location of the UAS to the same
coordinates. This phase of the attacks
results in a continuously high number
of navigation commands starting around
t = 1400 as shown in the bottom panel
of Figure 7. For attack detection, we
specify formulas, either explicitly detect-
ing an unusual period of navigational
commands (F3), or detecting a group
of previously-defined unusual periodic
commands (F4). F3 states that there shall be no continuous navigation requests for more
than 30 time steps: ⇤[0,30]Cnav . Finally, F4 states that there shall be no continuous un-
usual periodic events for more than 60 time steps: ⇤[0,60]Cu. The formulas F1, F2, F3,
and F4 are not reliable indicators of an ongoing attack if viewed individually. Only by
considering the overall pattern, can we calculate a high probability for an ongoing at-
tack. In order to accomplish this, we feed the results of these formulas into a Bayesian
network for probabilistic reasoning. We estimate that 6 person-hours were spent writ-
ing, debugging, and revising the four temporal logic properties used for this experiment
and approximately 15 hours were spent on experimental setup and simulation.
Even if the attack was detected by the UAS operator, all attempts to change the
UAS to its original course would immediately be overwritten by the attacker’s high-rate
navigation commands. To due the altered home coordinates, any attempt of the UAS
to return to the launch site would fail as well. Rather it would fly to the target loca-
tion desired by the attacker. Furthermore, the simulation of this scenario showed that
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besides crashing the UAS intentionally, there was no simple way for the UAS opera-
tor to prevent this kind of hijacking. In particular, for autonomous missions, where the
UAS is flying outside the operator’s communication range, it is essential that the UAS
is capable of detecting such an attack autonomously.
In order to protect a UAS from attacks against command link jamming, a UAS
is sometimes deliberately put into a complete autonomous mode, where it does not
accept any further external commands [9]. Ironically, what was intended to be a security
measure could inhibit the operator’s attempts to recover a UAS during such an attack.
However, R2U2 enables the UAS to detect an ongoing attack autonomously in order to
enable adequate countermeasures.
4.3 GPS Spoofing
GPS plays a central role in the control of autonomous UAS. Typically, a flight plan for
a UAS is defined as a list of waypoints, each giving a target specified by its longitude,
latitude, and altitude. The FSW in the UAS then calculates a trajectory to reach the
next waypoint in sequence. In order to accomplish this, the UAS needs to know its own
position, which it obtains with the help of a GPS receiver. Due to limited accuracy,
only GPS longitude and latitude are used for navigation; the UAS’s current altitude is
obtained using the barometric altimeter.
For the control of UAS attitude, the UAS is equipped with inertial sensors. Ac-
celerometers measure current acceleration along each of the aircraft axes; gyros mea-
sure the angular velocity for each axis. Integration of these sensor values yields relative
positions and velocities. These data streams are produced at a very fast rate and are in-
dependent from the outside interference but very noisy. Thus, the inertial sensors alone
cannot be used for waypoint navigation. Therefore, the FSW uses an Extended Kalman
Filter (EKF) to mix the inertial signals with the GPS position measurements. If the in-
ertial measurements deviate too much from the GPS position, the filter is reset to the
current GPS coordinates.
Several methods for attacking the GPS-based navigation of a UAS are known, in-
cluding GPS jamming and GPS spoofing. In a jamming attack, the signals sent from the
GPS satellites are drowned out by a powerful RF transmitter sending white noise. The
UAS then cannot receive any useful GPS signals anymore and its navigation must rely
on compass and dead reckoning. Such an attack can cause a UAS to miss its target or
to crash. A more sophisticated attack involves GPS spoofing. In such a scenario, an at-
tacker gradually overpowers actual GPS signals with counterfeit signals that have been
altered to cause the UAS to incorrectly estimate its current position. That way, the UAS
can be directed into a different flight path.
This type of attack became widely known when Iran allegedly used GPS spoof-
ing to hijack a CIA drone and forced it to land on an Iranian airfield rather than its
base [6,31]. Subsequently, researchers from the University of Texas at Austin suc-
cessfully demonstrated how a $80M yacht at sea,5 as well as a small UAS can be
directed to follow a certain pattern due to GPS spoofing [13]. Because civil GPS sig-
5 http://www.ae.utexas.edu/news/features/humphreys-research-group
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nals are not encrypted it is always possible to launch a GPS spoofing attack. For such
an attack, only a computer and a commercially available GPS transmitter is necessary.
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Fig. 8. Set of traces that indicate GPS spoofing
We can employ our R2U2 framework to
detect realistic GPS spoofing attacks like
the common attack scenarios described
in [13]; whereas that paper discusses
attack detection in theory we demon-
strate it via hardware-in-the-loop simu-
lation on-board our IronBird UAS. Here
we focus on attack detection; techniques
to avoid or mitigate GPS spoofing are be-
yond the scope of this paper.
Our developed R2U2 model moni-
tors the quality of the GPS signal and
the inertial navigation information. For
our experimental evaluation, we defined
a UAS mission that flies, at a fixed al-
titude, toward the next waypoint south-
south-west of the current UAS location.
When spoofing occurs, the attacker modifies the GPS signal in such a way that it tricks
the UAS into believing it is still flying a direct route as expected. In reality, however,
the UAS is actually veering off to reach a target point defined by the attacker. Figure 8
shows the relevant signals during this mission. Here, we focus on the latitude as ob-
served by the UAS. The top panel shows the point of the spoofing attack and the trace
for the temporal development of the UAS latitude as observed by the UAS (black) and
the actual UAS position (blue). A severe and increasing discrepancy can be observed as
the effect of the attack. As the actual position (ground truth) is not available to the on-
board FSW, R2U2 reasons about relationships with alternate signals that convey similar
information. The inertial navigation unit produces an error or offset signal that reflects
the deviation between the current position observed by GPS and the inertial sensors.
The next two panels of Figure 8 shows that these offset signals can become substan-
tially large during the actual spoofing period, when the GPS locations are gradually
moved to the attacker’s target. The bottom panel shows the spoofing detection output
stream from R2U2.We estimate that 10 person-hours were spent on model development
and approximately 45 hours were spent on experimental setup and simulation.
Again, these signals are not individually absolute indicators that an attack has hap-
pened. Flying in areas with weak GPS coverage, for example, in a mountainous or urban
environment, could produce similar signals. Therefore, in our R2U2 models, we aim to
take into account other observation patterns and use a Bayesian network for probabilis-
tic reasoning. Information supporting the hypothesis of an attack could include prior
loss of satellite locks, transients in GPS signals, or other types of attacks. In the case of
the captured CIA drone, an Iranian engineer claimed to have jammed the drone’s com-
munications link in order to force the drone into an autopilot mode and then initiated
the GPS spoofing attack [31].
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5 Conclusion
We have extended our REALIZABLE, RESPONSIVE, UNOBTRUSIVE Unit (R2U2) to en-
able real-time monitoring and diagnosis of security threats. This includes the ability to
reason about complex and subtle threats utilizing indicators from both the UAS system
and its software. Our embedded implementation on-board a standard, flight-certifiable
FPGA meets stated FAA requirements and efficiently recognizes both individual at-
tack indicators and attack patterns, adding a new level of security checks not available
in any previous work. Case studies on-board a real NASA DragonEye UAS provide a
promising proof-of-concept of this new architecture.
The myriad directions now open for future work include considering software in-
strumentation to enable more FSW-related compromises and doing hardware-in-the-
loop simulation experiments to detect these. We plan to extend this technology to other,
more complex UAS and beyond, to other types of aircraft and spacecraft with different
configurations and capabilities. A major bottleneck of the current R2U2 is the manual
labor required to develop and test every temporal logic formula and BN; we are cur-
rently considering methods for making this a semi-automated process to better enable
future extensions.
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